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INTRODUCTION 
In late January 2013, the Third District Court of Appeal sent 
shockwaves throughout the real estate community with regards to 
condominium associations’ rights as unit owners. In Aventura 
Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condominium Association1 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2014; B.A., Economics & 
Anthropology, Emory University, 2011. I would like to thank the Florida Law Review for 
everything it has given me during my final two years of law school. I will cherish all the friends 
I have made through this great organization and those that have helped me become a better 
writer. I would like to thank Lisa Renée Fassett for her continued love and support and 
Professor Dennis Eisinger for helping me pick this topic. Lastly, I would like to thank my family 
for always helping me out along the way. 
 1. 105 So. 3d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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(Spiaggia), the appellate court interpreted Florida Statute § 718.1162 in 
an unprecedented way. The court held that if a condominium 
association takes title to a unit before the bank forecloses on a 
defaulting unit owner, the association is jointly and severally liable for 
all past due assessments with the previous owner that came due, up to 
the time of transfer of title.3 Condominium associations across Florida4 
became worried that the Spiaggia decision could spark a judicial trend 
that limits associations’ ability to recoup delinquent assessment fees.5 
Although the Spiaggia court likely ruled correctly from an appellate 
perspective, the outcome of the case is contrary to the legislative intent 
of § 718.116 and could have disastrous consequences for Florida 
condominium associations. 
This Comment begins by explaining in great detail the facts and 
procedural posture of Spiaggia from the trial court to the appellate court 
level. Following the factual analysis, this Comment discusses the 
potential and actual effects of Spiaggia and looks to the legislative 
intent of § 718.116 to attempt to resolve the existing conflict. Finally, 
this Comment raises various issues that the Florida Legislature should 
address in reaction to the Spiaggia decision. 
I.  The Facts: Aventura Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean 
Condominium Association 
A.  Trial Court Analysis 
To understand why the Spiaggia decision may have profound effects 
on Florida condominium associations, it is first necessary to examine 
the dispute between Aventura and Spiaggia. In July 2008, Spiaggia 
initiated lien foreclosure proceedings against the owner of unit number 
402 (Unit) because of past due assessments6 owed to Spiaggia Ocean 
Condominium Association.7 Accordingly, in July of 2009, Spiaggia 
                                                                                                                     
 2. FLA. STAT. § 718.116 (2009). 
 3. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638. 
 4. Cf. James L. Oliver, Beyond Consumer Protection: The Application of the Interstate 
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act to Condominium Sales, 37 FLA. L. REV. 945, 945–46 (1985) 
(stating that Florida has consistently led the nation in condominium sales and modification of 
condominium law). 
 5. Roberto C. Blanch, Condo Association Laws Need a Legislative Fix, MIAMI HERALD 
(Mar. 3, 2013). 
 6. Condo Assessments, OWNACONDO, http://www.ownacondo.com/Assessments.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that “[c]ondo[minium] assessments, sometimes called 
association fees, are the payments made by condominium owners to cover the common 
expenses of the entire property,” which may include water charges, gas charges, building 
maintenance fees, and parking lot cleaning fees, among others). 
 7. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 637. 
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acquired a default final judgment of foreclosure against the Unit owner 
and a foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 17, 2009.8 The 
holder of the first mortgage on the Unit, the Bank of New York (Bank), 
subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings in September 2009 
against the original owner of the Unit and named Spiaggia as a 
defendant.9 
At the scheduled foreclosure sale, Spiaggia placed the sole bid to 
take title of the Unit subject to the first mortgage held by the Bank.10 
Spiaggia had standing to take title because under § 718.116(5)(a), “[t]he 
association has a lien on each condominium parcel to secure the 
payment of assessments.”11 Thus, apart from when there is an atypical 
condominium association agreement, almost every condominium 
association has a statutory lien on its units as a way to enforce payment 
of assessment fees that are levied on unit owners. No other parties 
submitted a bid, most likely because the first mortgage, “far exceeded 
the value of the Unit.”12 Typically only parties with a direct interest in 
the sale are willing to bid for a title subject to a mortgage that is much 
greater than the value of the property. Third parties usually bid on an 
overvalued mortgage only if the party can acquire title through an 
inexpensive bid or if that party foresees the value of the property 
significantly appreciating over the duration of the mortgage.13 However, 
at the time of the foreclosure sale (December 2009), the Florida real 
estate market was collapsing and the Florida condominium market was 
especially feeling the effects.14 Thus, it is not surprising that Spiaggia 
took title to the Unit because although the mortgage was overvalued, 
Spiaggia had an interest in the property because it was a primary way 
for the condominium association to generate revenue through its 
assessment fees.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 638. 
 11. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(5)(a) (2009); Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 639. 
 12. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638. 
 13. Another reason a third party investor may try and bid on a mortgage that far exceeds 
the value of the property is if the purpose of the investment is long-term. What that typically 
means is the investor is planning on generating income from the property after the mortgage has 
been paid off, enough so to justify the cost of the overvalued mortgage. 
 14. Harriet Johnson Brackey, South Florida’s Condo Crisis: Prices at Seven-Year Lows, 
PALM BEACH POST (Apr. 18, 2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/business/
real-estate/south-floridas-condo-crisis-prices-at-seven-year-l/nL6Mr/; see also Prashant Gopal, 
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After acquiring title, Spiaggia, like most condominium associations, 
leased the Unit in order to generate income.15 Put another way, Spiaggia 
attempted to mitigate its losses from a defaulting unit owner by 
temporarily acquiring title to the Unit and leasing the Unit as opposed to 
leaving the Unit vacant and not collecting any assessment fees. The 
Bank subsequently acquired a final judgment of foreclosure, and a 
second foreclosure sale was set for September 30, 2010.16 At the second 
foreclosure sale, Aventura was the successful bidder and acquired title 
to the Unit, “at which point [Spiaggia] relinquished its ownership 
interest.”17 After Aventura obtained title to the Unit, Spiaggia sought to 
recover from Aventura any “past due assessments, late fees, and interest 
that had accrued since the original owner defaulted.”18  
Spiaggia asserted that Aventura was a third-party purchaser and thus 
was liable under § 718.116(1)(a) of Florida’s Condominium Act.19 
Aventura claimed that contrary to Spiaggia’s interpretation of 
§ 718.116(1)(a), it was not liable for past due assessments and 
countered that Spiaggia was responsible for the assessments owed by 
the original owner.20 Aventura explained that because Spiaggia was the 
intervening owner between the original Unit owner and Aventura, a 
literal interpretation of the statute dictates that Spiaggia is “liable for all 
assessments which come due while he or she is the unit owner.”21 
Seeking clarification, Aventura brought a declaratory judgment 
action asking for an interpretation of § 718.116(1)(a) and arguing that it 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638. 
 16. Id. The Bank in effect holds the “true” title to the unit and the condominium 
association holds a statutory lien on the unit to force unit owners to pay assessment fees. If the 
condominium association did not have a statutory lien, then Banks or mortgagees would be 
responsible for forcing owners to pay assessment fees—something that mortgagees have no 
direct interest in. Thus, without some legal method to force unit owners to pay assessment fees, 
the condominium association would have trouble maintaining the premises because garnering 
assessment fees would be quite difficult. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (2009). 
A unit owner, regardless of how his or her title has been acquired . . . is liable 
for all assessments which come due while he or she is the unit owner. 
Additionally, a unit owner is jointly and severally liable with the previous 
owner for all unpaid assessments that came due up to the time of transfer of 
title. This liability is without prejudice to any right the owner may have to 
recover from the previous owner the amounts paid by the owner. 
FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a). 
 20. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638. 
 21. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a). 
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was liable only for assessments accruing after it took title to the Unit.22 
After both parties moved for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in 
favor of Spiaggia, holding that Spiaggia’s “lien did not merge with the 
certificate of title it was issued in connection with its foreclosure 
action.”23 The trial court further explained that Aventura was “liable for 
all amounts owed as of the date it was issued the certificate of title, 
including amounts accruing while [Spiaggia] held title, less all amounts 
received by [Spiaggia] through rents or other mitigation efforts.”24 The 
trial court concluded its holding by stating that contrary to the language 
of § 718.116(1)(a), Spiaggia was not jointly and severally liable to 
Aventura for any amount.25 
B.  Appellate Court Analysis 
1.  Majority Opinion: “There’s a New Sheriff in Town” 
Aventura, feeling amiss because of the extra payments it was then 
legally responsible for, filed an appeal to the Third District Court of 
Appeal, arguing that the trial court incorrectly interpreted 
§ 718.116(1)(a) and Spiaggia should be responsible for the past due 
assessments.26 Shocking condominium associations across Florida, the 
appellate court agreed with Aventura and held Spiaggia jointly and 
severally liable for the past due assessments from the time the original 
Unit owner had title to when Spiaggia relinquished its ownership 
interest to Aventura.27  
The appellate court’s reasoning focused on four issues: (1) the 
interpretation of § 718.116(1)(a); (2) whether Spiaggia’s lien merged 
with its certificate of title issued at the December 2009 foreclosure sale; 
(3) if there is an exception to the statute when the condominium 
association itself is an owner; and (4) whether Aventura was on notice 
as to the amounts owed on the Unit.28  
The appellate court began its analysis by interpreting the language of 
§ 718.116(1)(a). It held that the language, “a unit owner is jointly and 
severally liable with the previous owner for all unpaid assessments that 
came due up to the time of transfer of title,” was “plain” and should be 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 638 n.3. 
 25. Id. at 638. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 639. 
 28. Id. at 638–40. 
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applied literally.29 Thus, regardless of intent or who the previous owner 
actually was, as long as a person was by law the previous owner, that 
person should be held jointly and severally liable for all unpaid 
assessments up to the transfer of title. 
After establishing its interpretation of the statute, the appellate court 
addressed Spiaggia’s first argument that “its lien did not merge with the 
certificate of title issued at the December 2009 foreclosure sale.”30 
Spiaggia presented case law that ruled merger exists only where the 
parties demonstrate a clear intent for merger to take place.31 However, 
the appellate court distinguished this case law by explaining that those 
cases did not involve mortgage foreclosure actions like the instant 
case.32 The court went further and presented case law that held a 
mortgage merges with a final judgment of foreclosure and is 
extinguished by the sale of the underlying property.33 The court 
acknowledged that the lien survives the foreclosure as recognized by 
statute, but emphasized that the statute dictates “that the prior owner is 
jointly and severally liable with the current owner for all past due 
assessments up to the time of the transfer of title.”34 
The third issue addressed by the appellate court was whether an 
exception should be read into § 718.116(1)(a) when the condominium 
association itself is an owner.35 Spiaggia argued that § 718.116(1)(a) is 
one part of a “general framework . . . designed to provide condominium 
associations with a mechanism for the preservation of their rights with 
regard to fee assessments.”36 Spiaggia then referenced § 718.116(5)(a) 
and § 718.116(6)(a) as textual support for its argument that “the sole 
purpose of this statutory scheme is to provide condominium 
associations with the means by which they can protect their interests, 
and that it would be absurd to apply the Statute in . . . a way [that 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at 638 (emphasis in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Kaufman, 581 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 1991) (“[A]n intention that 
a transaction operate as a merger is essential to a merger in equity.”) (emphasis added) and 
Contos v. Lipsky, 433 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“In the absence of evidence 
showing an express or implied intent, we must presume that the lessee . . . intended the result 
most beneficial to her, that is, no merger.”)). 
 32. Id. at 639.  
 33. Id. (citing One 79th St. Estates, Inc. v. Am. Inv. Servs., 47 So. 3d 886, 889 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010) (“When a mortgage is foreclosed, the mortgage is ‘merged’ into the final 
judgment and loses its separate identity.”) and Nack Holdings, LLC v. Kalb, 13 So. 3d 92, 94 
n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). 
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would] deprive a condominium association of its right to collect past 
due assessments.”37 The appellate court, however, did not agree with 
Spiaggia’s compelling argument. 
The court explained that § 718.116(1)(a) provides a remedy for 
condominium associations faced with owners in default by listing 
“current owners and prior owners” as a class of persons from whom a 
condominium association can demand relief for delinquent 
assessments.38 The court justified this reasoning through a free-market, 
libertarian analysis. The court explained that nowhere in the 
condominium statute does it “require[] a condominium association to 
position itself as the current or prior owner.”39 Rather, the predicament 
that fell upon Spiaggia was a result of “external market forces, namely 
that condominium associations may find . . . that no one is willing to bid 
on a foreclosed unit at foreclosure sale.”40 Regardless of the 
impracticability, the court goes further in a footnote to explain that 
nothing in the condominium statute prevents Spiaggia from trying to 
collect unpaid assessments from the prior owner whom Spiaggia 
purchased the Unit from.41 The court does not provide any context as to 
how realistic this option may be and thus fittingly hid this somewhat 
obvious but impractical suggestion in a footnote.42 
Lastly, the appellate court addressed whether the issue of notice has 
any effect on Aventura’s liability for the unpaid assessments. Spiaggia 
argued that Aventura was on notice of the amounts owed on the Unit 
and thus knew the liabilities associated with the Unit it purchased.43 The 
court struck down this argument by stating that nothing in the record 
demonstrates that Aventura knew it would be entirely responsible for 
the unpaid assessments as a result of purchasing the property.44 The 
court reasoned that Aventura purchased the Unit understanding there 
were liabilities attached to it, but because § 718.116(1)(a) allows for 
“joint and several liability,” Aventura should not bear the entire burden 
of past due assessments.45 Thus, after narrowly interpreting 
§ 718.116(1)(a) and disagreeing with the arguments raised by Spiaggia, 
the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and held Spiaggia 
jointly and severally liable for past due assessments up until it 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. n.4. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 639. 
 44. Id. at 640. 
 45. Id. 
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relinquished its title to Aventura.46 
2.  Dissenting Opinion: Judge Shepherd’s Understandable 
Empathy 
Although agreeing with parts of the majority opinion, Judge Frank 
A. Shepherd was not satisfied with the outcome of the case and used 
legislative intent and statutory interpretation to reach a different 
conclusion. The dissent agreed with the majority that Spiaggia’s 
statutory lien, justified by § 718.116(5)(a), survives the foreclosure.47 
Next, the dissent identified that the majority interpreted “the prior 
owner” to be Spiaggia, and because the prior owner “is jointly and 
severally liable with the current owner for all past due assessments up to 
the time of the transfer of title,” Spiaggia is partially responsible for the 
past due assessments.48 The dissent then wondered, “what happen[ed] 
to the lien?”49 Judge Shepherd goes on to say that contrary to the 
majority opinion, there is “a way to give meaning to both the statutory 
lien in subsection 5(a) and the statutory language of subsection 
(1)(a).”50 
Using reliable statutory interpretation principles, the dissent began 
its analysis by noting that constructing laws to give effect to every 
clause and part thereof is typically favored.51 Applying this principle, 
the dissent found that the legislative purpose of § 718.116 was to “assist 
condominium associations to be made whole in the collection of past 
due assessments, while . . . [also] not unduly impairing the value of 
collateral held by first mortgagees.”52 This is evidenced by the 
legislature giving condominium associations statutory liens over units 
that are under the association’s jurisdiction.53 Using these logical 
deductions, the dissent asserted that third-party purchasers “are subject 
to old-fashioned caveat emptor principles.”54 The third-party buyers’ 
“protection lies in satisfying themselves before purchase, whether by 
contract or judicial sale, of the status of past-due assessments on the 
unit.”55  
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (Shepherd, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. (quoting id. at 639 (majority opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. “A corollary to this rule, of course, is that a construction that would leave without 
effect part of the language used should be rejected if possible.” Id. (citing State v. M.M., 407 So. 
2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. Caveat emptor is the common law “doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their 
own risk.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 55. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 640 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). 
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The crux of the dissent’s divergence from the majority opinion 
focused on Judge Shepherd’s interpretation of § 718.116(6)(a). 
Reinforcing the notion that statutory interpretation is a “holistic 
endeavor,” the dissent found that § 718.116(1)(a) and (6)(a) are 
compatible with one another.56 What Judge Shepherd meant by this was 
that joint and several liability between Aventura and Spiaggia 
(§ 718.116(1)(a)) and Spiaggia’s option to enforce its existing statutory 
lien right (§ 718.116(6)(a)) are both options that Spiaggia can choose to 
execute. Section 718.116(6)(a) explicitly states that, “[t]he association 
may bring an action in its name to foreclose a lien for assessments in the 
manner a mortgage of real property is foreclosed and may also bring an 
action to recover a money judgment for unpaid assessments without 
waiving any claim of lien.”57 Thus, using principles of statutory 
interpretation, the dissent asserted that § 718.116(6)(a) is evidence that 
the legislature intended to make condominium associations whole, and 
Judge Shepherd felt that this evidence held more weight than relying on 
the ambiguous term “previous owner” that is fundamental to the 
majority’s analysis.58 In conclusion, the dissent would affirm the trial 
court’s holding.59 
II.  Immediate Effects from the Spiaggia Decision 
After the Third District Court of Appeal released the Spiaggia 
opinion, many real estate attorneys were in disbelief.60 It was almost as 
if condominium associations were on their way to not being able to 
collect past due assessment fees from any future purchaser. Luckily, the 
court’s holding did not reach this far and Spiaggia applies only in a 
specific set of circumstances.61  
Spiaggia applies only if the condominium association foreclosed 
upon its statutory lien and took title to the property, and the bank that 
held the first mortgage, “completed its foreclosure action and sold the 
property at public auction.”62 Then, at the public auction, a third-party 
bidder purchased the property from the bank.63 The crux of this fact-
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 641. 
 57. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 58. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 641 & n.6 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 59. Id. at 641. 
 60. E.g., PeytonBolin Legal Update—Aventura Management LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean 
Condominium Association, PEYTONBOLIN PL, http://www.peytonbolin.com/2013/01/
peytonbolin-legal-update-aventura-management-llc-v-spiaggia-ocean-condominium-association/ 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014) [hereinafter PeytonBolin]. 
 61. Id. (concluding similarly). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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specific scenario is that the condominium association takes title to the 
property before the third party purchases the property at the bank 
foreclosure sale because, according to Spiaggia, this qualifies the 
association as an intervening owner.64 Being the intervening owner 
between the original defaulting owner and the third-party purchaser 
means the association is “jointly and severally liable with the [original 
defaulting] owner for all unpaid assessments.”65 Thus, as opposed to 
holding the party who purchased the first mortgage (from essentially the 
defaulting owner) liable for past due assessments, the association is held 
liable for the assessment fees simply because of the order in which the 
association temporarily took title. As will be explained later, this 
emphasis on the order of who took title seems to stray away from the 
overall purpose of § 718.116, which is to make the condominium 
association at least partially whole. 
Spiaggia will primarily affect how condominium associations handle 
defaulting unit owners in the future. Traditionally, associations have 
“avoided acquiring properties through their own foreclosure actions for 
the past-due fees, given that lenders typically moved quickly on their 
foreclosure actions and the associations’ ability to recover delinquent 
fees is limited under the law.”66 However, because of the rise in 
foreclosures, judicial backlog and “dilatory tactics of homeowners and 
counsel”67 data shows that it takes an average of 2.5 years for banks to 
complete foreclosures in Florida.68 What does this mean for defaulting 
unit owners? Typically, it allows for substantial periods of “free rent” 
where the association is waiting on the bank to foreclose its lien and the 
unit owner takes advantage of that wait by not paying any assessment 
fees to the association.69 Furthermore, banks are typically not in a hurry 
to complete the foreclosure process, obtain title to the unit, and begin 
paying fees associated with unit ownership.70 This is evidenced when 
banks search for note purchasers and essentially try to short sale their 
interest in the property in order to “stem their losses.”71  
 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.  
 65. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (2009). 
 66. Blanch, supra note 5. 
 67. Peter P. Hargitai, Gotcha! Associations Corner Mortgagees for Past Due Assessments, 
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Jan. 2013, at 19, 20. 
 68. Blanch, supra note 5; cf. Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted En Masse: Collateral 
Damage Arising From the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 976 (2010) 
(discussing how banks are ignoring market conditions if they think opting for foreclosure 
actions against landlords/renters is their best option). 
 69. Hargitai, supra note 67, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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In response to these long delays, condominium associations began 
moving quickly to obtain ownership of the defaulting owners’ units 
before the banks completed the foreclosure process.72 Associations did 
so to mitigate the lost revenue that associations had already suffered. 
Thus, instead of letting the unit either stay vacant or worse, have the 
defaulting owner stay there “rent free,” associations can acquire title 
and lease the units to recover assessment fees that would otherwise not 
be available if the association had sat idle and waited for the bank to 
complete the timely foreclosure process. This not only benefits the 
association economically, but it helps “bring back the sense of 
community that condominium living promotes [and] [n]on-delinquent 
unit owners generally care for their units.”73  
Once the bank eventually completes their foreclosure, the 
association has received assessment fees (income) for sometimes up to 
three years, and thus is much better off than if they had just waited for 
the bank to obtain title to the unit.74 Additionally, associations were also 
able to bill the new owner (as a result of the bank’s foreclosure) for the 
past due fees that the defaulting owner owed the association. This 
process was completed in accordance with the “safe harbor” provision 
of § 718.116(1)(b)(1). Under the safe harbor provision, the liability of 
the first mortgagee is limited to the lesser of either the fees that accrued 
during the twelve months immediately preceding the acquisition of title 
or one percent of the original mortgage debt.75 Thus, by acquiring title, 
the association could collect both assessment fees from leasing the unit 
to new owners and could bill the new third-party owners in accordance 
with the § 718.116 “safe harbor” provision. In short, the association 
was able to retain financial stability in the event of defaulting unit 
owners. 
However, Spiaggia drastically changes this process. If the 
association acquires title to the unit before the bank completes the 
foreclosure process (thereby becoming an intervening owner), the 
Spiaggia court holds that associations are then responsible for the past 
due assessments of the defaulting owner.76 Thus, condominium 
associations have to carefully weigh their options. If an association 
predicts it may take in more money from leasing a unit than it would 
receive from the bank or a third-party investor under the safe harbor 
provision, then, and only then, should the association obtain title to the 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Blanch, supra note 5. 
 73. Hargitai, supra note 67, at 22. 
 74. Blanch, supra note 5. 
 75. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(b)(1) (2009). 
 76. Aventura Mgmt., LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condo. Ass’n, 105 So. 3d 637, 638–39 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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unit.77 This prediction can sometimes be difficult to determine, but the 
Spiaggia decision places the onus on the association to make this 
decision, even if it results in the association recouping much less 
delinquent fees than anticipated. Is this the purpose of § 718.116? 
Should the burden be on the association, who is typically the innocent 
party in a unit foreclosure proceeding? These issues are examined in the 
following section, which analyzes the latent ambiguities of § 718.116. 
III.  The Legislative Intent Behind Florida Statute § 718.116 
In recent years, Florida Statute § 718.116 has plagued attorneys and 
courts alike with its provisions that are sometimes difficult to interpret 
because of their ambiguous meanings. In particular, the question of 
whom condominium associations can collect delinquent assessments 
from during the foreclosure process has caused a great deal of 
confusion. According to the majority opinion in Spiaggia, the 
determination of who is responsible for unpaid assessments is 
exclusively answered in subsection (1)(a) of § 718.116.78 This is a result 
of the majority’s strict interpretation of § 718.116(1)(a), but as the 
Spiaggia dissent points out, statutory interpretation is a “holistic 
endeavor.”79 Furthermore, § 718.116(1)(a) does not explain if “unit 
owner” or “previous owner” can be the actual condominium association 
itself and whether § 718.116(6)(a) has any effect on subsection (1)(a).80 
These latent ambiguities can be resolved using principles of statutory 
interpretation, which dictate that “[t]he primary guide to statutory 
interpretation is to determine the purpose of the legislature.”81 
A.  Conflicting Viewpoints? 
“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting 
to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction . . . .”82 This, put 
simply, is not applicable to § 718.116. If it were, the groundbreaking 
Spiaggia decision would not have made headlines across South Florida 
because the legal community would have expected the appellate court to 
rule in accordance with the typical interpretation of § 718.116.83 The 
confusion surrounding § 718.116 focuses on whether the Florida 
legislature “intended to make a purchaser who acquired the property via 
                                                                                                                     
 77. PeytonBolin, supra note 60. 
 78. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638. 
 79. Id. at 641 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). 
 80. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a), (6)(a). 
 81. Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 836 (Fla. 1963). 
 82. A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931). 
 83. See, e.g., Blanch, supra note 5; PeytonBoylin, supra note 60. 
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foreclosure . . . jointly and severally liable with the previous owner for 
all unpaid assessments” if that purchaser was the condominium 
association itself.84 Because the answer to this is unclear, the first step 
in interpreting § 718.116 is to examine the legislative history of the 
statute. 
Unfortunately, the legislative history seems to suggest mixed 
purposes behind the creation and amendments to § 718.116. To begin, 
the legislative intent behind § 718.116(1)(a) does not appear to weigh in 
favor of the condominium association. Since the statute’s creation, the 
language “regardless of how his or her title has been acquired” has not 
been materially amended and implies that subsection (1)(a) is an all- 
inclusive provision, no matter what the status of the “unit owner” 
actually is.85 This assumption is bolstered when looking at the 1991 
amendment that added “a unit owner is jointly and severally liable with 
the previous owner for all unpaid assessments that came due up to the 
time of transfer of title.”86 The legislative history suggests that the 
lawmakers were not concerned with who the unit owner actually was, 
but were more interested in categorizing what the unit owner was 
responsible for upon becoming a bona fide “unit owner.” 
However, the legislative history presents a different view when 
examining the July 1, 2010 amendments made to § 718.116.87 In 
particular, the amendment to § 718.116(1)(b)(1) illustrates the 
legislature’s desire to provide a mechanism allowing community 
associations to collect past due assessments.88 The 2010 amendment 
extends the period of time an association can collect assessments from a 
first mortgagee, its successor, or an assignee from six months to twelve 
months immediately preceding that person’s acquisition of title.89 This 
statutory change demonstrates the legislature’s intent to increase the 
scope of the association’s recovery for delinquent assessments in 
addition to increasing the liability of purchasers. This falls in line with 
the legislative purpose Judge Shepherd discussed in his Spiaggia 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Ambiguity of Florida Statute § 718.116 and Its Impact on Community Associations’ 
Ability To Collect Unpaid Assessments (Spring 2011 Litigation Quarterly), COLE, SCOTT & 
KISSANE, P.A. (May 18, 2011), http://www.csklegal.com/quarterly/publications/ambiguity-of-
florida-statute-%C2%A7-718-116-and-its-impact-on-community-associations%E2%80%99-abil 
ity-to-collect-unpaid-assessments/. 
 85. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a); see Act of June 22, 1976, ch. 76-222, sec. 1, § 718.116, 
1976 Fla. Laws 414, 426 (“A unit owner, regardless of how title is acquired, including a 
purchaser at a judicial sale, shall be liable for all assessments coming due while he is the unit 
owner.”). 
 86. PeytonBolin, supra note 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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dissent. Judge Shepherd noted that “the fundamental purpose of the 
Legislature in promulgating section 718.116 was to assist condominium 
associations to be made whole in the collection of past due assessments, 
while at the same time not unduly impairing the value of collateral held 
by first mortgagees.”90 This interpretation, however, seems to conflict 
with the legislative intent behind § 718.116(1)(a) discussed above. 
Therefore, the question becomes, how do we reconcile these two 
conflicting views when looking at the legislative purpose behind 
§ 718.116 as a whole? 
B.  Resolving the Conflicting Purposes 
The answer is simple and makes sense when viewed in the context of 
history: the Florida Legislature clearly did not envision associations as 
actual owners of these types of properties. Yes, condominium 
associations have statutory liens over every unit, which some may argue 
qualifies them as “quasi-owners;” but the only reason they have these 
statutory liens over the units is to have a reliable method of enforcing 
unit owners to pay their assessment fees. As Attorney Peter Hargitai put 
it, “the drafters did not envision a condominium market saturated with 
100 percent financing, negative equity, and underfunded 
associations.”91  
Thus, when looking at § 718.116(1)(a)—although the legislative 
history suggests that its purpose is all inclusive (i.e., “all unit owners” 
without exception)—the legislature meant this provision to apply to unit 
owners under the notion that condominium associations would never be 
considered “unit owners.” This is because, up until 2008, condominium 
associations were practically never “unit owners” as used in 
§ 718.116(1)(a). It was almost never worthwhile to acquire title as a 
condominium association because banks typically moved quickly 
through foreclosure and safe harbor provisions limited associations’ 
ability to recover past due fees.92 Thus, if condominium associations 
were never “unit owners,” then drafting a provision that would have no 
real world application would be pointless for the Florida Legislature. 
Unfortunately, the conditions of the Florida condominium market have 
drastically changed and thus the legislature must act accordingly to 
clarify exactly how condominium associations fit within the purview of 
§ 718.116. 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Aventura Mgmt., LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condo. Ass’n, 105 So. 3d 637, 640 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Shepherd, J., dissenting). 
 91. Hargitai, supra note 67, at 20. 
 92. Blanch, supra note 5. 
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CONCLUSION 
Taking into consideration all of the arguments raised by both parties 
at the trial and appellate court level, the end result seems to have been 
the strictly correct one. Using a literal interpretation of § 718.116, the 
court correctly applied subsection (1)(a) to the facts of the case. 
Although provisions of § 718.116 were sometimes ambiguous as 
applied to the facts of Spiaggia, the legislative intent was too opaque to 
allow the court to deviate from the grounded statutory language. 
Scholarly analysis and legislative history do partially weigh in favor of 
giving broader powers to associations for recovering past due 
assessments, but a court interpreting § 718.116 literally does not allow 
for much speculation as to how the legislature intended § 718.116 to 
apply to unit owners who were also condominium associations. 
Spiaggia’s best argument was that its statutory lien merged with the 
certificate of title, but unfortunately, the remedy presented to the court 
that could potentially facilitate the compatibility between 
§ 718.116(1)(a) and § 718.116(6)(a) was unpersuasive.  
Although the logically correct analysis decided the holding of the 
appellate court, the outcome was not consistent with the legislative 
purpose of § 718.116. The legislative history does not indicate a strong 
preference towards associations’ rights as unit owners because the 
drafters never envisioned a situation where associations obtaining title 
themselves would be more beneficial than waiting for the banks to 
foreclose on the defaulting owners. It is imperative that the Florida 
Legislature amends § 718.116 to account for this type of situation 
presented in Spiaggia because without clarification, condominium 
associations will be at the mercy of the courts whose only guidance is 
an outdated statute. 
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